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The GFOA would like to thank the City of Colorado Springs for allowing us to share this information, and Public Sector Digest for their assistance.

The Research and Consulting Center is the management analysis and consulting arm of the Government Finance Officers Association and is nationally recognized for its comprehensive analytical and advisory services, and specialized research on state and local government finance. Since beginning operations in 1977, the GFOA Research and Consulting Center has provided advisory services to hundreds of local, county, and state governments; public utilities; elementary and secondary education systems; and transit authorities.

The GFOA’s Research and Consulting Center encourages enquires about this study or about repeating the analysis for other governments — please contact Shayne Kavanagh at 312-977-9700 or skavanagh@gfoa.org.
The Case of the City of Colorado Springs

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Executive Summary

Reserves are the cornerstone of financial flexibility. Reserves provide a government with options for responding to unexpected issues and a buffer against shocks and other forms of risk. Managing reserves, however, can be a challenge. The main question is how much money to maintain in reserve – how much is enough, and when does it become too much? This can be a sensitive question, since money held in reserve is money taken from constituents, and it can be argued that excessive reserves should be returned to citizens in the form of lower taxes.

The City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, has been considering this question, especially in light of its volatile revenue portfolio and the fact that it cannot easily increase taxes to compensate for other changes in its financial condition; for example, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights – a statewide provision restricting all governments in the state from raising tax rates without voter approval – limits the City’s ability to increase taxes. The City engaged the Government Finance Officers Association to help produce an answer. The GFOA is a non-profit association of approximately 17,500 state and local government finance professionals and elected officials from across North America, and a key part of its mission is to promote best practices and good public finance, including reserve policies.

The GFOA worked with Colorado Springs to analyze the risks (based on the model originally described in the GFOA publication, Financial Policies) that influence the level of reserves the City needs as a hedge against uncertainty and loss. Three primary risks were identified: volatility of sales tax revenue; the potential for the City’s storm sewer and bridge infrastructure to fail; and the City’s vulnerability to extreme events such as wildfires, floods, and, to a lesser extent, snowstorms. Secondary risk factors were also examined, including cash flow and the potential for unexpected spikes in expenditures. In addition, a benchmarking survey of the reserves held by comparable cities provided context.

Calculating the Reserve

The GFOA reviewed three primary risk factors in order to assess the potential magnitude of the City’s exposure. The "Triple-A" approach to accounting for uncertainties was an important part of GFOA’s analysis.

Accounting for Uncertainty – The “Triple-A” Approach

Sizing a reserve requires estimating highly uncertain events, like natural disasters and economic downturns. To develop an adequate response, the GFOA used the “Triple-A" approach:

- **Accept.** First, we must accept that we are subject to uncertainty, including events that we haven’t even imagined.
- **Assess.** Next, we must assess the potential impact of the uncertainty. Historical reference cases are a useful baseline.
- **Augment.** The range of uncertainty we really face will almost always be greater than we assess it to be, so we should augment that range. Historical reference cases provide a baseline, but that baseline may not be adequate to account for all future possibilities.
Revenue Volatility. The City’s primary concern was the volatility of sales tax income, and its most important vulnerability in this area would be an economic downturn. The GFOA reviewed sales tax volatility back to 1996 in order to observe monthly variations and longer-term trends. Past experiences suggested that Colorado Springs should prepare for a 20 percent decline in sales tax revenues over 25 months as a plausible worst-case scenario; this would equal about $23 million in reserves. However, since the City would presumably reduce its spending in the event of such a severe downturn, the reserve fund wouldn’t have to cover the entire decline in revenue. The City budget office estimated that the budget could be reduced by almost $10 million without creating a major disruption to services (although there would of course be some degree of negative impact on service quality). Thus, Colorado Springs should maintain a reserve of at least $13 million to cover the remaining portion of the worst-case revenue gap and to help the City make a “soft landing” under those circumstances. An additional $7.5 million is required to cover the other revenues that make up the general fund; these were found to be considerably less volatile than the sales tax.

Infrastructure Risks. A government might need general fund reserves to repair or replace an asset that fails unexpectedly. In Colorado Springs, the two major asset classes deemed to have the greatest associated risk were bridges and storm sewers. Thirteen bridge structures had a high risk rating, with an estimated replacement value of almost $23 million – an average of roughly $1.75 million per bridge. A reserve that covers one or two bridges should be adequate, but covering three might be more prudent, for a $5.25 million reserve. No installation dates or condition assessments were available for the 406 miles of storm lines the City manages, but the estimated replacement cost for all storm sewers was a little more than $588 million. Since this lack of information made it impossible to assess the risk of failure, the best that could be done was to make an assumption. The GFOA did know that about 10 percent of the total dollar value of the City’s bridge inventory is in the higher-risk category, so it started with that number for storm sewers, which translates to $58 million. The recommended reserve amount is about 20 percent of the high-risk bridges, which equates to $11.6 million for storm sewers.

Extreme Events. Finally, the City is subject to extreme events that pose significant threat to life and property, particularly wildfires and floods. Historically, however, the financial impact of these events has been manageable. For example, the 2012 wildfire was the worst in Colorado history, but the total cost to the City was only $3.75 million – out of an annual budget of approximately $220 million. Of course, the scale of future events is uncertain, as is the timing of FEMA reimbursement and the portion of event response costs that would likely already be covered by existing budgeted resources. Taking this into account, a reserve of $5 million to $7.5 million for extreme events appears reasonable.

Adding It Up. The analysis above, along with the analysis of the secondary risk factors (particularly uncertainty regarding future payments for pension liabilities and expenditures for unfavorable lawsuit judgments) led to the following reserve components. The GFOA further recommended that the reserve amounts be categorized by component, making the purpose of the reserve more transparent. For example, having a reserve for emergencies and a reserve for economic uncertainty would make their purpose more clear than one all-encompassing reserve.
Budgetary Uncertainty Reserve

$13 million for sales tax economic uncertainty +
$7.5 million for economic uncertainty in other revenues +
$6.25 million for pension payment uncertainty =

$27 million, or approximately 12.5 percent of general fund revenues\(^3\) as budgetary uncertainty reserve

Emergency Reserve

$5.25 million for critical bridge failure +
$11.6 million for critical storm sewer replacement +
$5 million to $7.5 million for extreme events +
$2 million to $4 million for expenditure spikes from lawsuits =

$27 million, or approximately 12.5 percent of general fund revenues as an emergency reserve

Combining the components gives us a target of approximately 25 percent of general fund revenues, which is in line with the range of reserves actually maintained by other cities that are comparable to Colorado Springs. It is also greater than the 16 percent the GFOA considers a minimum baseline level.\(^3\)
1. Introduction

Reserves are the cornerstone of financial flexibility. Reserves provide a government with options to respond to unexpected issues and afford a buffer against shocks and other forms of risk. Managing reserves, though, can be a challenge. Foremost is the question of how much money to maintain in reserve. How much is enough and when does a reserve become too much? This can be a sensitive question because money held in reserve is money taken from constituents and the argument could be made that excessive reserves should be returned to citizens in the form of lower taxes.

The City of Colorado Springs (the “City”) has been considering this question recently, especially in light of the volatility of its revenue portfolio and the fact that the City cannot easily increase its taxes to compensate for other changes in its financial condition. The City engaged the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) to help produce an answer. The GFOA is a nonprofit association of over 17,000 state and local government finance professionals and elected officials from across North America. A key part of GFOA's mission is to promote best practices in good public finance, including reserve policies.

The GFOA's approach to reserves does not suppose “one-size-fits-all.” GFOA's Best Practice on general fund reserves recommends, at a minimum, that general-purpose governments, regardless of size, maintain unrestricted fund balance in their general fund of no less than two months of regular general fund operating revenues or regular general fund operating expenditures (i.e., reserves equal to about 16 percent of revenues). However, this 16 percent is only intended as a baseline, and it needs to be adjusted according to local conditions. To make the adjustment, the GFOA worked with the City to conduct an analysis of the risks that influence the need for reserves as a hedge against uncertainty and loss.

A risk is defined as the probability and magnitude of a loss, disaster, or other undesirable event. The GFOA's framework of risk assessment is based on the risk management cycle: identify risks; assess risks; identify risk mitigation approaches; assess expected risk reduction; and select and implement mitigation method. The framework focuses primarily on risk retention, or using reserves, to manage risk. However, the framework also encourages the City to think about how other risk management methods might alleviate the need to retain risk. For example, perhaps a risk could be transferred by
purchasing insurance or relying on another organization or accounting fund to manage the risk. It might also be possible to avoid a risk by discontinuing activities that are creating a risk for the general fund. Hence, a thorough examination of the risk factors should not only help lead to customized reserve target size, but also should improve the City’s understanding of the risks it faces and its overall financial risk profile.

As a first step in this project, the GFOA conducted a basic review of the risk factors that generally influence the amount of reserves a municipal government should hold. This review enabled the City and the GFOA to classify factors as either primary risks or as secondary risks. Exhibit 1.1 lists how the risk factors were classified.

The next section presents an overview of the primary risk factors and the City’s level of exposure. The third section reviews secondary risk factors that have less weighty implications for the City’s general fund reserve strategy, but which still should be considered. The fourth and final section of the report presents the findings of the analysis, including a customized target reserve level for the City’s general fund and other ideas to improve the financial health of the City.

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**Exhibit 1.1**

Categorization of Risk Factors that Influence Reserve Levels for Colorado Springs

**Primary Risk Factors**
- Revenue (Sales Tax) Volatility
- Infrastructure Upkeep
- Vulnerability to Extreme Events and Public Safety Concerns

**Secondary Risk Factors**
- Leverage
- Expenditure Volatility
- Liquidity/Cash Flow
- Growth of the Community
2. Primary Risk Factor Analysis

This section presents the three most important risk factors examined by the GFOA and the City’s exposure: the volatility of the City’s revenue portfolio, maintenance/replacement of the City’s infrastructure (focusing on bridges and storm sewers), and vulnerability to extreme events and public safety concerns.

REVENUE SOURCE STABILITY

Volatile revenue sources call for a higher reserve level in order to avoid the need for sudden service cutbacks should revenues drop unexpectedly. Some revenues are inherently volatile. The sales tax is usually considered to be a volatile revenue source because it is much more sensitive to swings in the economy than a revenue source like the property tax, for instance. This is an important consideration for Colorado Springs, considering that sales taxes (and the closely associated use tax) account for over half of the general fund’s revenues. No other revenue source comprises more than a fifth of general fund revenue (the next largest is transfers from other funds, at about 17 percent); the property tax, normally a large revenue source for municipal governments, accounts for less than 10 percent.

This section will first analyze the volatility of the sales tax, as well as two closely associated revenues – the use tax and sales tax audit revenue. Following that, the stability of the general fund’s other important revenue sources will be examined.

Sales and Use Tax

A first step is to understand the level and nature of volatility in the sales tax. The sales tax appears to follow fairly predictable seasonal patterns. Exhibit 2.1 shows annual sales tax revenues for 2007 through 2011 and Exhibit 2.2 shows monthly sales tax revenue since 2006. In Exhibit 2.1, use tax and revenues from sales tax audits are removed. These revenues add “noise” to the pure sales tax data, making it more difficult to analyze. They are also much smaller revenue sources – use tax is 7 percent the size of sales tax and audit revenues are 3 percent of all sales tax revenue. These revenues will be discussed later in the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit 2.1</th>
<th>Five-Year Trends for Sales Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>$111,735,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Change</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The red circles in Exhibit 2.2 denote January revenues, which are always the highest of the year due to holiday shopping. The green circles show revenues from July, October, and April, which all see revenue spikes (due to quarterly sales tax filings for smaller vendors). This pattern and even the relative magnitude of the spikes are quite consistent from year to year, even as far back as 1996. In fact, a statistical analysis shows that only a 2 percent change in sales tax revenue is attributable to random variation. About 91 percent is due to fundamental economic trends/business cycles (also known simply as “trend-cycle”), and 7 percent is explained by seasonal variation.

This means that random fluctuations in the sales tax should not concern the City. However, it also means that the influence of economic cycles is very strong. An unexpected shift in the economy could have serious ramifications for City revenues, as the City has experienced in the wake of the 2001 recession and the more recent Great Recession. Exhibit 2.3 (on the following page) shows the trend-cycle line for sales tax overlaid on monthly sales tax revenues. The red arrows show the beginning and end-points of significant downtrends. The first one started in April 2001 and lasted until May 2003. The trend-cycle declined 6.6 percent over 25 months, or about a quarter percent per month. The second started in July 2007 and lasted until April 2009. The trend-cycle declined 11.2 percent, or just over half a percent per month.

Obviously, the decline associated with the Great Recession was much sharper than the 2001 recession, both in terms of overall decline and speed of the decline. In fact, so severe was some of the financial fallout from the Great Recession that some have dubbed it what acclaimed financial thinker Nasim Talib has termed a “Black Swan” event – a rare and unpredictable event that has an extreme impact. Black Swans are, by definition, impossible to predict, so the best that anyone can do is to be prepared. The accomplished forecasting scientist Spyros Makridakis has suggested a “Triple-A” approach (described on the next page) for dealing with this kind of uncertainty.

Exhibit 2.2
Seasonal Peaks in City Sales Tax Revenue

There are four consistent spikes in sales tax revenue during the year, with January being the most important. The other spikes occur in July, October, and April.
1. **Accept.** First we must accept that we are subject to uncertainty. Even though the sales tax is subject to relatively little random variation, it is clearly subject to Black Swans. Because it is relatively easy to imagine scenarios that could cause the Colorado Springs economy to suffer (e.g., European financial crisis, federal debt crisis, a significant reduction in military spending due to federal budget shortfalls, etc.), we must also accept that the economy is subject to additional potentially dangerous unknowns that we cannot imagine.

2. **Assess.** Next we must assess the potential impact of the uncertainty. Past history can provide a useful reference point. We saw earlier that a downturn in the trend-cycle has lasted as long as 25 months and has been as severe as a 0.53 percent monthly decline. The rate of decline is more relevant to the discussion of general fund reserves because a more protracted decline should be dealt with by restructuring the budget, not necessarily with continuous use of fund balance. Even so, it is important to consider both.

3. **Augment.** The range of uncertainty we really face will almost always be greater than we assess it to be, so we should augment that range. For example, we used the experience of the Great Recession as a reference point for our worst-case monthly decline (0.53 percent). However, many economists believe that the effects of the Great Recession would have been much worse had the federal government not taken the actions that it did. Who is to say that continued gridlock in the federal political system (or other circumstances) won’t prevent an effective mitigating response to the next crisis? As a rule of thumb, Makridakis suggests doubling your range of uncertainty if you have little historical data to rely on or multiplying it by 1.5 if you have more. We have a good deal of data, so a 1.5 multiplier seems appropriate, giving us a 0.8 percent monthly decline. That translates to a potential 20 percent decline over 25 months. This does not necessarily mean that the City should reserve this entire amount, though, because

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**Exhibit 2.3**

**Sales Tax Monthly Revenue and Trend-Cycle**

The City has experienced two major downturns in the sales tax trend-cycle. The first one started in April 2001 and lasted until May 2003. The trend-cycle declined 6.6 percent over 25 months. The second started in July 2007 and lasted until April 2009. The trend-cycle declined 11.2 percent.
presumably, in the event of a financial Black Swan, the City would take action to reduce spending – not just continue to spend as it had before. The implications of the sales tax analysis, along with the other analyses performed by the GFOA, for the City’s reserve strategy will be addressed in the fourth section of this report.

As mentioned earlier, audit revenues were removed from the sales tax data for purposes of this analysis. As Exhibit 2.4 shows, from 2007 through 2011, audit revenues ranged between $3.3 million and $2.2 million. It has experienced some fairly significant swings in this time as well. However, a $1 million potential for variation is probably not material in the entire City revenue portfolio. The City expects sales tax audit revenues to continue into the future within the same general range that they have occurred in the past.

**Sales Tax Point of Comparison**

Appendix 1 provides a similar analysis of monthly sales tax data from the City of Boulder, Colorado, in order to provide a sense of context for how volatile sales tax revenue is in another jurisdiction.

Use taxes were also removed from the sales tax data. Exhibit 2.5 (on the following page) shows the five-year trend analysis for use taxes. Use taxes are not quite as volatile as audit revenues, but are still rather volatile. In fact, GFOA’s statistical analysis showed that almost 15 percent of the variation in use tax is attributable to simple randomness (compared to 2 percent for sales tax). However, more importantly, the use tax has experienced a notable decline since 2008. Examination of the long-term history shows that the revenue experienced a rapid increase in 2005, coinciding with the construction boom and use taxes from commercial construction and manufacturing equipment. Revenue stayed at about this level until 2008, when tax revenue declined considerably as these industries experienced a slowdown in their growth. Hence, the change we see in Exhibit 2.5 is less a product of random variation and more a product of a fundamental change in the tax base. Hence, use taxes have likely settled in at a new, lower level of yield that is reflective of reduced economic activity in commercial construction and manufacturing equipment (in fact, the lowest level since 1996). As such, there is probably little risk of another significant downside move. In fact, an analysis of the sources of the use tax shows that income from construction-related trades has fallen substantially in recent years. For example, revenue from building general contractors in 2011 was 12 percent of what it was in 2007, and revenue from subcontractors was 27 percent of 2007 levels. Also, total vacancy rates for commercial properties have hovered around 10 percent for the last two years, up from 7.7 percent in 2008. This indicates that there may be excess capacity in Colorado Springs, such that a significant uptick in building is not likely in the near term.

**Exhibit 2.4**
**Five-Year Trends for Sales Tax Audit Revenue***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>$3,284,390</td>
<td>$2,369,723</td>
<td>$3,250,245</td>
<td>$2,189,116</td>
<td>$2,210,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Change</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>-27.1%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While sales tax is clearly the most important revenue, an analysis of reserve requirements should take account of other revenues as well, given that other revenues comprise half of the City’s budget. Below is a summary of other major sources of revenue and their associated volatility risk.

**Property Taxes.** Property taxes comprise only about 9 to 10 percent of the City’s budget. The City has experienced a steady decline in property tax revenues in recent years, with a primary cause being a reassessment and lower property values owing to the decline in the housing market. Nationally, the housing market seems to have stabilized, at least to the point where another major decline is unlikely. An examination of Colorado Springs’ housing prices shows that Colorado Springs seems to essentially follow national trends.

**Charges for Service.** Charges for service are about 6 to 7 percent of the general fund budget. Revenues from charges for service have fallen substantially in recent years, now budgeted at 70 percent of the 2009 actual revenues. This is mostly due to a sharp decline in charges for services for construction/development regulation. Hence, the user fees do have some vulnerability to economic cycles. A reserve could be useful, but the City might also consider other policies to mitigate risk. For example, a policy that sets cost recovery goals for fees would prompt a discussion of how to reduce costs if revenues were not up to expectations. Regardless, it may be helpful to have a small reserve in order to allow gradual adjustments to drop-offs in revenues. In recent history, the total charges for service revenues have dropped $3 million in one year. At this point, fees that are more sensitive to economic conditions (e.g., construction-related fees) have probably reached or are approaching a bottom. Accordingly, a $3 million reserve should probably be more than adequate.

**Intergovernmental Revenue.** Intergovernmental revenue is about 9 to 10 percent of the general fund budget. By far, the most important component of this is the highway users tax, at about 90 percent of the total. The highway users tax is intended to support traffic safety and road maintenance programs. There has been political pressure at the state level to reduce the resources that support the tax, but, so far, this has not happened. However, if one of these efforts were successful the City would find itself with reduced revenue. City staff believes that the Funding Advancements for Surface Transportation and Economic Recovery (FASTER) portion of the highway users tax is the most vulnerable to being eliminated (about $1.5 million), so reserve strategy could focus on replacing that amount for one year (after which point the City would presumably have adapted).

The City also receives a number of grants for capital projects, and some for operations. These grants are not accounted for in the general fund, but if the grants were to be lost there could be some pressure on the general fund to continue the associated service. For capital projects, the City would likely cancel or defer the project or find another source of funding, rather than using reserve to make up the shortfall from a lost grant. Lost grants for operations may require some support from the general fund in order to provide continuity in service (assuming the City cannot simply discontinue the service). A reserve of $3 million appears to be adequate to cover this risk, based on the level of grants used to support core operating programs currently.

### Exhibit 2.5
**Five-Year Trends for Use Tax**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Annual Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007$</td>
<td>$9,264,962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$8,490,105</td>
<td>-8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$5,668,451</td>
<td>-33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$6,454,560</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$6,024,785</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Grant Policy
The City auditors have pointed out that overreliance on grants is a potential risk for the City. A policy that limits the City’s exposure to the risky elements of grants could be helpful. Section 4 of this report describes how grant policies might be helpful.

Transfers from Other Funds. The City receives about 17 percent of its revenue from transfers from other funds (from City utilities). This transfer is a matter of City Council policy. There do not appear to be any major threats to the continued economic viability of this policy, so any change would have a political genesis. A decision to reduce the transfer should be made in the context of how it will impact the budget, so a reserve should not be necessary.

INFRASTRUCTURE
Healthy infrastructure makes for an economically vital community. However, worn infrastructure poses a potential risk of untimely failure. General fund reserves may be needed to repair or replace an asset that fails unexpectedly. In Colorado Springs, the two asset classes that were deemed to be of the greatest importance are bridges and storm sewers.

Exhibit 2.6 shows a risk profile for bridges and culverts. Risk is defined as the product of probability of failure and the consequences of failure. Probability of failure is based on the bridge sufficiency index (BSI) provided by the City staff. A lower BSI indicates a bridge that is in worse condition and ultimately a higher risk (probability) to fail. Consequence is based on cost – the higher the replacement cost of an asset, the higher the consequence to the City if that asset were to fail.20 As can be seen in the exhibit, 13 bridge structures have been identified as having a high risk rating (those bridges in the red area, which have a total score of between 8 and 10, when the scores from each axis are added together). These bridges have an estimated replacement value of $22,752,672. This averages to about $1.75 million per bridge. A reserve that covers one or two bridges should be adequate,
but using the “Triple-A” rule (described earlier) of doubling our expectation for uncertainty, preparing for the premature failure of three of these bridges might be more prudent. This equates to a $5.25 million reserve.

In addition to the bridges and culverts, the City manages 406 miles of storm lines. However, neither install dates nor condition assessments were available for any storm lines. The estimated replacement cost for all storm sewers is $588,052,836. Since the information necessary to assess risk of failure is not available, the best that can be done is to make an assumption. We do know that about 10 percent of the total dollar value of the City’s bridge inventory is in the higher risk category, so it may be reasonable to start with that number for storm sewers, which would translate to $58 million. We also know that about 20 percent high risk category of bridges was recommended as a reserve amount, which would equate to $11.6 million.

We will review how this analysis for bridges and storm sewers fits into an overall reserve strategy in Section 4 of this report.

**VULNERABILITY TO EXTREME EVENTS AND PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS**

This factor concerns the extreme events (e.g., natural disasters) the City is vulnerable to, the public safety programs that must be funded during the occurrence of an extreme event, and the federal or state programs that would help and how long it would take to get assistance. For example, reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) does not always occur right away, so it is important to have reserves to absorb the cost in the meantime, and FEMA does not necessarily reimburse 100 percent of the cost of responding to an event.

Discussions with the City’s Emergency Operations Manager reveal that Colorado Springs is most at risk for wildfires and floods. Wildfires are probably the most important risk, as the fires of 2012 underlined. About 20-25 percent of homes in Colorado Springs are subject to wildfire risk, although fires that damage homes are not that common. The most recent fire was the most destructive in Colorado history. It impacted around 12,000 acres and burned 347 homes. By comparison, the most recent other fires of an extreme size were in 2005 and 2000 and impacted 35 and 800 acres, respectively. No homes were burned in either of those fires – in fact, one must look back to around 1950 to find the last time before 2012 that homes in the City of Colorado Springs were burned by wildfire.

Large wildfires can be expensive to respond to, requiring police and fire personnel for suppression of the fire and evacuation of people. Many other city departments are involved in the recovery efforts. FEMA reimbursement is not immediate and does not typically cover all the City’s costs of responding. Further, a fire is likely to interrupt the City’s sales tax revenue.

Currently, the City only has estimated costs for the most recent fire, which is $3.75 million in personnel time, mutual aid costs, and other direct expenses. The estimate pertains to the actual firefighting within the City limits and the emergency protective measures taken (e.g., evacuation, security, activation of the emergency operations center, etc.). Of this, the expenses eligible for a 75 percent FEMA reimbursement are estimated to be $2.15 million. Adding together the FEMA ineligible expenses, plus the 25 percent unreimbursed expenses results in a figure of $2.14 million. At least some of this represents expenses that the City would have incurred anyhow (e.g., firefighters on duty). The City government did not incur any significant direct property damage as a result of the fire (probably around $30,000), but there may be some indirect damage to storm sewers later on, as a result of increased run-off, from the fire-damaged areas. The City engages in mitigation efforts, such as deforestation of areas that are at risk for wildfire, but it is still important for the City to retain a reserve to be prepared for future wildfires.
Floods are also a concern because they damage infrastructure, require a City emergency response, and require debris removal afterwards. The most severe floods were in 1935 and 1965. Otherwise, smaller floods occur about 6 or 7 times in a 10-year period. The last flood that qualified as a FEMA disaster occurred in 1999, though it wasn’t on the scale of the 1965 or 1935 floods. The cost to the City to address the flood damage of 1999 was $2,670,158. The federal share of the project was 75 percent, or $2,002,619; the state share was 12.5 percent, or $333,770; and the City share was the remaining 12.5 percent, or $333,770. This would equate to about $3.67 million in total costs and $460,000 for the City’s final share in today’s dollars.

Blizzards represent a final, less severe risk. The magnitude of impact is not as great as for fires or floods, but the City still incurs an unexpected cost. The last significant cost was in 2007, when the City needed to appropriate an additional $400,000 to deal with snow storms.

In summary, Colorado Springs faces a risk from several types of extreme events that have the potential to cause loss of life and property and to disrupt business. The City has taken steps to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the community in light of these risks. Fortunately, however, these extreme events do not appear to constitute a large risk to the City’s financial position. For example, a reserve of $4 million (compared to annual City revenues of about $220 million) would be more than adequate to cover the cost of either the most recent fire or a flood of similar severity to the 1999 flood, before FEMA reimbursement.

However, using Makridakis’s “Triple-A” approach (described earlier), it may behoove the City to augment the level of risk it is preparing for. We have a very limited number of data points to inform us, so a higher multiplier seems appropriate. If we multiplied $3.75 million by 2 we would get $7.5 million. However, much of an extreme event’s cost would be reimbursed by other parties (e.g., a 75 percent reimbursement from FEMA) and some of this figure would represent costs the City would incur anyhow (e.g., regular salaries for public safety personnel), so a $7.5 million reserve might be excessive. Discussions with City staff indicated that the City would have incurred about one third of the most recent fire’s costs in the normal cost of doing business, and that about half of the reimbursement from FEMA can be expected to be received within six months of the expenditure. Using this as a reference point, a reserve of $3.3 million might represent the minimum prudent reserve amount because it accounts for the fact that the City will have to bear some of the costs of responding to an extreme event in its regular budget, and that another significant portion of the cost will be reimbursed quickly by FEMA. A reserve of $5 million might be a middle ground because it does not account for FEMA reimbursement (which is outside the control of the City).

Section 3 will consider the all the foregoing analyses together in order to present a final recommended reserve target for the City.
3. Secondary Risk Factor Analysis

This section presents an overview of risk factors that are less complex or of lower magnitude than the primary risk factors, but that also have implications for the City’s general fund reserve strategy.

LEVERAGE

A highly leveraged organization has less flexibility. Examples of leverage include long-term debt, pension obligations, and obligations for post-employment health care. Reserves are a critical source of financial flexibility, so high leverage may call for higher reserves. This section will address each of the aforementioned sources of leverage.

Debt

The City has very little debt. Exhibit 3.1 demonstrates this by comparing the City’s level of indebtedness to other cities. Exhibit 3.1 includes a group of cities that Colorado Springs has identified as “Best in Class” for the purpose of comparing the City’s business practices to those of other, similar cities. Exhibit 3.1 also includes two “sales tax comparable” cities – Colorado cities that receive a large portion of their revenue from sales taxes, but are not otherwise as similar to Colorado Springs. Finally, the exhibit provides summary statistics of all these municipalities. Exhibit 3.1 compares debt along

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit 3.1</th>
<th>Comparison of Colorado Springs’ Indebtedness with Other Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Best in Class Cities”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Colorado Springs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt per Capita</td>
<td>422,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Service as a % of Expenditures</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sales Tax Comparables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Colorado Springs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The City has substantially lower debt levels than the average of the comparison group.
two commonly used measures of indebtedness. The first, debt per capita, measures the burden placed on citizens by municipal indebtedness. The second measure is debt service (principal and interest payments) as a percent of city expenditures. This figure measures the pressure placed on the budget by debt payments. Colorado Springs is well below the average on both of these measures. This means that Colorado Springs should not find its financial flexibility reduced by excess debt. In fact, the City’s debt capacity could offer an alternative source of financial flexibility. For example, if the City were found liable for an exceedingly large judgment that was due immediately, it might be able to use debt instruments to pay the amount over time.

The reader should note that the GFOA did not use only the general fund financial information to calculate these ratios, but rather used the broader categories of “governmental activities” and “governmental funds,” which can be found in any comprehensive annual financial report. This is because all the cities accounted for debt in different funds, so looking at just the general fund would provide a partial, and inaccurate, impression. However, the aforementioned categories have fairly standard meanings across government and they include most of the general government services one would typically associate with a municipality, such as public safety and public works. Therefore, they address debt of a general nature, which does have direct relevance to the financial flexibility of the general fund.

These general government categories, though, exclude utilities and other more business-like activities. The business-like category of services was excluded for two main reasons. First, municipalities do not provide these types of services as consistently as they do general government services. Second, these services, particularly utilities, often carry large amounts of debt, and would therefore have had a major impact on the indebtedness measures. However, this debt has a much more indirect relationship to the financial flexibility of the general fund.

Pensions
The City is involved in four different self-funded pension arrangements, all of which are closed to new participants.

- The Old Hire Police Pension Fund has been closed and has 166 total members. The plan is 81 percent funded as of January 1, 2012. GFOA Best Practices call for 100 percent funding of pension liabilities. The plan has an unfunded liability of $16.1 million, which translates into an annual actuarial required contribution (ARC) of $1.5 million for 2013, up from $1.4 million in 2012.

- The New Hire Pension Plan – Police Component has 650 members and a funded ratio of 80.2 percent. The plan has an unfunded liability of $48.8 million, which translates into an annual ARC of $10.6 million for 2013, up from $9.6 million in 2012.

- The Old Hire Fire Pension Fund has 193 members and is 84.1 percent funded. The plan has an unfunded liability of $15.5 million, which translates into an annual ARC of $1.5 million for 2013, which is about the same as 2012.

- The New Hire Pension Plan – Fire Component has 286 members and is 79.2 percent funded. The plan has an unfunded liability of $25.9 million, which translates into an annual ARC of $4.7 million for 2013, which is down from $5.2 million in 2012.

The City also participates in two statewide plans. The Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association for is for civilian employees. As of December 31, 2011, the PERA Local Government Division’s funded ratio was 69.3 percent, with an unfunded liability of $1.277 billion. Of course, this underfunding could have some impact on the City in the form of increased contribution rates in the future. The Fire and Police Pension Association of Colorado provides a defined benefit plan for sworn officers. It is funded at over 100 percent as of January 1, 2011.
Another issue common to all pension funds is the assumed rate of return on pension fund assets. Pension funds often assume return rates of around 7 to 8 percent annually. The recent performance of investment markets has led some to question the return assumptions the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association uses. If circumstances were to require the association to lower its return assumptions, then member governments would have to increase contributions to make up the difference.23

Assuming that the City keeps up with its ARC payments, the unfunded accrued liabilities should, in theory,24 be covered by the end of the amortization period (which can vary with the plan, but typically is between 20 and 30 years). Keeping up with the ARC payments is a matter of City budgetary policy, and not really an issue that should be addressed through using reserves. However, given the uncertainty around pension issues, it is difficult to say when increases would occur or how much they might be. Accordingly, it would be prudent to hold some reserve to help make a more gradual adjustment to any potential large increases in contribution rates. The City currently pays about $10.5 million in annual contributions to the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association and about $14.5 million to the other pensions, for total of about $25 million. A reserve of $6.25 million would cover a 25 percent increase in pension costs. Of course, an increase in the City’s contribution would be felt over many years, but the reserve will allow the City to make a gradual adjustment or to more easily absorb a larger increase in contributions in one year.

The City has considered different actions to mitigate its pension liabilities, including increasing the contributions required from employees and switching to a defined contribution pension plan. It has also shifted away from a single-employer plan to the state plan for the most newly hired sworn officers, which should be less volatile and help mitigate risk.

**Other Post-Employment Benefits (OPEB)**

The City allows retired sworn police officers to stay on a City-sponsored medical plan. The cost of this benefit is paid for by the City as it is incurred. The City’s annual required contribution for OPEB is $2.2 million and there is a net obligation of $11.2 million. The City has taken steps to contain its OPEB liability, such as eliminating the City-provided subsidy for retiree health care for new hires and going to a flat (instead of variable) subsidy for existing employees. Hence, similar to pensions, the City will likely not experience near-term, large expenditure spikes or a drastic decrease in the City’s financial flexibility owing to OPEB liabilities. Also, like pensions, the financial pressure created by OPEB liabilities is best addressed through the budget process, not general fund reserves.

**EXPENDITURE VOLATILITY**

This risk factor refers to potential spikes in expenditure, usually arising from a special, non-recurring circumstance. Expenditures of a recurring nature should not be addressed through the use of reserves, since reserves do not represent a sustainable source of funding for recurring expenditures. Rather, recurring expenditures should be accommodated in the operating budget.

In Colorado Springs, lawsuits appear to be the most important potential source of expenditure spikes, especially because the City’s risk management funds do not carry a large amount of reserves themselves, requiring the general fund to backstop them.

Discussions with the City’s attorney and risk management professional reveal the following:

- The City faces a number of litigation cases each year. The average potential liability tends to be pretty consistent from year to year. The City normally budgets between $600,000 and $800,000 each year for claims, which generally has proven sufficient. In more recent years, the number of litigation cases has risen somewhat, but this does not appear to be a significant trend.
• The City is facing a couple of extraordinary special cases. Due to the sensitivity of the cases, they will not be discussed in detail in this report, but there is a significant degree of uncertainty around the amount the City could be liable for and if the City will be liable for anything at all. Hypothetically, the liability could represent tens of millions of dollars, but the City Attorney believes that an amount of between $2 million and $4 million is a more realistic estimate of the City’s potential risk. Also, under certain circumstances the City could negotiate a multi-year payment schedule for a large liability.

• In the State of Colorado, certain forms of cancer have been designated as work-related injuries for firefighters. Hence, the City’s worker’s compensation fund will face an increased liability, which will, in part, be covered by the general fund (since the general fund is one of the contributing funds to the worker’s compensation fund). This would not create an expenditure spike, but rather would manifest as an increased annual contribution (probably not to exceed $1 million to $2 million per year). Accordingly, this change to the City’s recurring expenditure structure should be handled through the City’s budget process.

In conclusion, it would seem prudent for the City to account for at least some of the risk associated with the extraordinary lawsuits in its reserves. The final section of this report will address how this risk fits in with the City’s total reserve goals.

GROWTH OF THE COMMUNITY
Rapid growth of the community could call for larger levels of reserves, lest service requirements expand beyond the City’s ability to continue services in the face of revenue interruption. For instance, property tax revenues may not be received until a couple of years after development occurs, yet the government will still need to provide for the public safety, health, and welfare of these members of the community in the meantime. Colorado Springs is a moderate growth community in a higher growth region. The City averages 1.5 percent growth in a region that grows 2 percent annually. The City does not rely heavily on property taxes, so is not heavily impacted by a lag between when services are required by a new development and when revenues are received. Also, the City requires developers to build much of the infrastructure associated with development (roads, parks, etc.), so it does not have to cover that expense. In conclusion, the fact that Colorado Springs is only expecting moderate growth in the next few years and that its development financing approach does not require City resources for large capital outlays means that the implications of growth for the City’s reserves are minimal.

LIQUIDITY
A larger amount of unreserved fund balance may be needed to avoid cash flow problems if the average maturity of receivables significantly exceeds the average maturity of payables. A common example of this can be found in governments that are heavily reliant on property taxes. The bulk of taxes may only be received at one or two times during the year, requiring reserves to bridge the months with lower receipts. As stated, Colorado Springs is not very reliant on property taxes at all. In fact, its revenue tends to come in fairly evenly over the year. Exhibit 3.2 (on the following page) shows the projected monthly balances for 2012. As the chart shows, the City’s ending balance actually moves steady upwards for almost the entire year, eventually dropping near the end (due to bond repayments), but still ending up higher than it started. Hence, the City does not appear to have a liquidity problem that requires reserves to cover the gap.
The City’s ending balances rise steadily throughout most of the year.

Exhibit 3.2
The City’s Projected Monthly Ending Balances for 2012

The City’s ending balances rise steadily throughout most of the year.
4. Recommendations
This section provides GFOA’s recommendations to Colorado Springs, based on the analysis presented in this paper. The first sub-section addresses the primary purpose of this report: to recommend a reserve target for Colorado Springs. The second sub-section provides other ideas related to reserve management strategy that Colorado Springs might find helpful, based on GFOA’s experience with best practices in public finance.

RECOMMENDED RESERVE TARGET FOR COLORADO SPRINGS
This section establishes the recommended reserve target for Colorado Springs. As a first step, the report will review the essential findings of the analysis for each risk factor. Next, the report will provide some helpful comparative information, such as the reserve levels maintained by other cities as well as rating agency standards. Finally, all of this information will be synthesized to reach a reserve target.

Comparative Reserve Information
When considering a reserve target it is helpful to consult outside standards. Two widely cited standards are GFOA’s Best Practices and rating agency guidelines. The GFOA Best Practice recommends, at a minimum, that general-purpose governments, regardless of size, maintain unrestricted fund balance in their general fund of no less than two months (16 percent) of regular general fund operating revenues or regular general fund operating expenditures. Standard & Poor’s considers reserves of between 1 percent and 4 percent of revenues to be “adequate,” while reserves above 15 percent are “very strong.”

It is also useful to consider the experiences of other governments. Exhibit 4.1 compares Colorado Springs’ unrestricted fund balances as a percent of general fund revenues to the same cities that appeared in the debt comparison (Exhibit 3.1). “Unrestricted fund balance” is usually used to describe the portion of fund balance that is available to serve as a reserve for the types of risk mitigation purposes that were described in this report (i.e., respond to extreme events, protect against revenue downturns, etc.). This is because unrestricted fund balance is the portion of fund balance that does not have restrictions placed on its use by outside authorities.
As Exhibit 4.1 shows, the typical unrestricted fund balance falls somewhere in between 20 percent and 25 percent of general fund revenues. Most of the cities in the analysis were closer to 20 percent, but two outliers (Indianapolis and Centennial) pulled up the average.

The average level of unrestricted fund balance (i.e., reserves) falls between 20 percent and 25 percent for the comparable group. Colorado Springs falls within this range right now. The outliers in the comparable group (Indianapolis and Centennial) have special circumstances.

Indianapolis had a very large amount of “committed” fund balance, which is a subcategory of “unrestricted” fund balance. “Committed” fund balance is considered to be the most constrained of three subcategories of unrestricted fund balance because the City’s management has committed those reserves for a very specific purpose (the other two subcategories are “assigned” and “unassigned”). While it is impossible to say from Indianapolis’s public reports, it could be that this unusually large amount has been accumulated to pay for a special project of some kind or is otherwise not intended as a hedge against risk. In fact, if this amount is removed, Indianapolis’s reserve drops to 22 percent—much more consistent with the other cities. None of the other cities had nearly as large an amount, by any measure, of committed reserves. For example, 61 percent of Indianapolis’s reserves are committed, while Colorado Springs only has about 3 percent in this category and Denver has about 8 percent, making Denver’s fund balances the most highly committed after Indianapolis.

As for Centennial, about 75 percent of Centennial’s reserves are in the “unassigned” subcategory (the least constrained of the three), which suggests that Centennial has simply accumulated a much higher relative level of reserves than the other governments in Exhibit 4.1. Interestingly, Centennial also has, by far, the lowest debt burden of any of the cities (see Exhibit 3.1). This high reserve, coupled with an extremely low debt burden suggests that Centennial has a significantly different economic base than the other cities. For example, the median household income in Centennial is $85,500, compared to $51,000 in Colorado Springs and $55,400 in the State of Colorado. The median home value in Centennial is $260,000, compared to $182,000 in Colorado Springs and $205,000 in the State of Colorado. In 2010, the unemployment rate in Centennial was 4.8 percent, compared to 9.4 percent in Colorado Springs. Although neither municipality relies very heavily on property taxes, it is interesting to note that the total assessed value of properties in Centennial is 34 percent greater on a per person basis than in Colorado Springs. Finally, Centennial’s general fund revenues are, on a per capita basis, 20 percent greater than those of Colorado Springs, even though Centennial appears to

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**Exhibit 4.1**

**Unrestricted Fund Balance Comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Best In Class Cities”</th>
<th>Colorado Springs</th>
<th>Fort Collins</th>
<th>Oklahoma City</th>
<th>Denver</th>
<th>Indianapolis</th>
<th>Charlotte</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted Fund Balance as a % of Revenues</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sales Tax Comparables</th>
<th>Colorado Springs</th>
<th>Lone Tree</th>
<th>Centennial</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted Fund Balance as a % of Revenues</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average level of unrestricted fund balance (i.e., reserves) falls between 20 percent and 25 percent for the comparable group. Colorado Springs falls within this range right now. The outliers in the comparable group (Indianapolis and Centennial) have special circumstances.
provide a more limited set of services to its citizens (for example, Centennial is served by a separate fire protection district and recreation district, while Colorado Springs provides these service directly). These distinctive characteristics have likely made it more practical for Centennial to accumulate a sizable reserve.

**Putting it All Together: The Reserve Recommendation**

In order to reach the final recommendation for a reserve target for Colorado Springs, let’s first review the individual analysis results from each of the risk factors.

**Primary Risk Factor – Revenue (Sales Tax) Volatility.** While the sales tax does show some volatility, this is due almost entirely to economic cycles and seasonal effects (as opposed to random variation). Therefore, the most important vulnerability the City has with respect to sales taxes is an economic downturn. A review of past economic downturns leads us to believe that the City should prepare for a potential 20 percent decline in sales tax revenues over 25 months as a plausible “worst case scenario” (this amounts to about $23 million in reduced revenue). However, the City would presumably reduce its spending in the event of such a severe downturn, such that a reserve to cover the entire amount of the revenue decline would not be necessary. The City budget office estimates that the budget could be reduced by just under $10 million without creating a major disruption to services (though service quality would be negatively affected to some degree, of course). This means the City should maintain a reserve of at least $13 million to fill the remaining portion of the revenue gap and to help the City make a “soft landing” in the case of a major revenue decline.

The City’s other revenue sources are fairly stable as a group, but as a prudent measure the GFOA has recommended establishing some reserves to account for volatility. These reserves added up to $7.3 million.

**Primary Risk Factor – Infrastructure.** General fund reserves may be needed to repair or replace an asset that fails unexpectedly. In Colorado Springs, the two asset classes that were deemed to be of the greatest importance are bridges and storm sewers.

Thirteen bridge structures have been identified as having a high risk rating. These bridges have an estimated replacement value of $22,752,672, an average of about $1.75 million per bridge. A reserve that covers one or two bridges should be adequate; it might be more prudent, however, to use the “Triple-A” rule of doubling our expectation for uncertainty and prepare for the premature failure of three of these bridges. This equates to a $5.25 million reserve.

The City manages 406 miles of storm lines. Installation dates and condition assessments were unavailable for any storm lines. The estimated replacement cost for all storm sewers is $588,052,836. Since the information necessary to assess risk of failure is not available, the best that can be done is to make an assumption. We do know that about 10 percent of the total dollar value of the City’s bridge inventory is in the higher risk category, so it may be reasonable to start with that number for storm sewers, which would translate to $58 million. We also know that about 20 percent high risk category of bridges was recommended as a reserve amount, which would equate to $11.6 million.

**Primary Risk Factor – Vulnerability to Extreme Events.** Although the City is subject to extreme events that pose a significant threat to life and property, historical experience has demonstrated that the financial impacts of these events have been manageable. For example, the most recent fire was the worst in Colorado history, but the total cost to the City was only $3.75 million (the City’s annual budget is about $220 million). Taking into account the uncertainty associated with the scale of future extreme events as well, as well as the timing of FEMA reimbursement and the portion of event response costs that are likely going to be already covered by existing budgeted resources a reserve for extreme events of $5 million seems reasonable, but an argument for a reserve of up to $7.5 million could also be made.
**Secondary Risk Factor – Leverage.** The City has very little debt, so the City’s reserve strategy does not need to account for reduced financial flexibility from debt.

The City has some financial pressure from pension obligations. It participates in a number of plans, none of which is 100 percent funded. The Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association is a particular concern for City officials because it has a low funding ratio and its assumptions around the return on plan assets have been publicly questioned for being too high. Both of these factors mean that the Association may require significantly increased contributions from its member governments.

Assuming that the City keeps up with its annual pension payments, the unfunded accrued liabilities should, in theory, be covered by the end of the amortization period (which can vary with the plan, but typically is between 20 and 30 years). Keeping up with the ARC payments is a matter of City budgetary policy, and not really an issue that should be addressed through using reserves. However, given the uncertainty around pension issues, it is difficult to say when increases would occur or how much they might be. Accordingly, it would be prudent to hold some reserve to help make a more gradual adjustment to any potential large increases in contribution rates. The City currently pays about $10.5 million in annual contributions to the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association and about $14.5 million to the other pensions, for total of about $25 million. A reserve of $6.25 million would cover a 25 percent increase in pension costs. Of course, an increase in the City’s contribution will be felt over many years, but the reserve will allow the City to make a gradual adjustment or to more easily absorb a larger increase in contributions in one year.

**Secondary Risk Factor – Expenditure Volatility.** The City is facing a few large lawsuits that could entail significant settlement costs if judgment goes against the City. The City attorney believes that $2 million to $4 million is a reasonable range to prepare for.

**Secondary Risk Factor – Liquidity/Cash Flow.** The City faces no important liquidity or cash flow problems that create a shortage of working capital.

**Secondary Risk Factor – Growth of the Community.** The fact that Colorado Springs is only expecting moderate growth in the next few years and that its development financing approach does not require City resources for large capital outlays means that the implications of growth for the City’s reserves are minimal.

In summary, the components of a recommended reserve are:

- $13 million for sales tax economic uncertainty
- $7.5 million for economic uncertainty in other revenues
- $6.25 million for pension payment uncertainty
- $5.25 million for critical bridge failure and $11.6 million critical storm sewer replacement, for a total of $16.85 million
- $5 million to $7.5 million for extreme events
- $2 million to $4 million for expenditure spikes from law suits

Many cities express their reserve policy target as single number (e.g., 16 percent of revenues). However, the GFOA has found that leading municipalities often find it helpful to segment their reserves into different categories because this makes the purpose of the reserve more transparent. For example, a reserve for “emergencies” and a reserve for “economic uncertainty” would provide more clarity on the purpose of the reserves than one all-encompassing reserve. The first three bullets above could comprise the budgetary uncertainty reserve, while the last three would form the emergency reserve,
leading to the following targets (which have been rounded to the nearest whole numbers for ease of use in policymaking):\textsuperscript{\textdegree}

**Budgetary Uncertainty Reserve**

\begin{align*}
\text{Budgetary Uncertainty Reserve} & = \text{$13 million for sales tax economic uncertainty} + \\
& + \text{$7.5 million for economic uncertainty in other revenues} + \\
& + \text{$6.25 million for pension payment uncertainty} = \\
\text{$27 million or about 12.5\% of general fund revenues}\textsuperscript{p} \text{as budgetary uncertainty reserve}
\end{align*}

**Emergency Reserve**

\begin{align*}
\text{Emergency Reserve} & = \text{$5.25 million for critical bridge failure and $11.6 million critical storm sewer replacement, for a total of $16.85 million} + \\
& + \text{$5-7.5 million for extreme events} + \\
& + \text{$2-4 million for expenditure spikes from lawsuits} = \\
\text{$27 million or about 12.5\% of general fund revenues as an emergency reserve}
\end{align*}

This provides a **target of about 25 percent of general fund revenues**, which is also in line with the range of reserves maintained by cities comparable to Colorado Springs and is above what the GFOA considers to be the minimum baseline level that a government should maintain (16 percent).\textsuperscript{31} These reserves would be considered part of the “unrestricted” portion of the City’s fund balance.\textsuperscript{32}

**OTHER IDEAS TO SUPPORT THE GENERAL FUND RESERVE STRATEGY**

This section presents other ideas that Colorado Springs may wish to consider, relative to its reserve strategy. These ideas include: enhanced sales tax monitoring, a user fee cost recovery policy, a volatile revenue policy, a short-term borrowing policy, and a grants policy.

**Sales Tax Monitoring**

Because a potential decline in sales tax revenue is the major driver for the City’s need to retain reserves, it might consider additional methods to monitor the potential direction of its sales tax revenue. The City already employs some fairly sophisticated long-range forecasting methods. It should continue to refine these practices, and continue looking for leading indicators of sales tax performance. However, the GFOA did not conduct an in-depth examination of the City’s long-range forecasting methods, so this report will focus on how some of the techniques presented in this paper might be helpful going forward.

First, the City might monitor a 12-month, centered moving average, updating it each month. As Exhibit 2.3 demonstrated, the 12-month moving average reveals long-term trends that are not as readily apparent from monthly data, especially when month-to-month fluctuations are so dramatic (even if the fluctuations are rather predictable). If the moving average starts to turn down, it could indicate a real trend. Of course, the problem with this approach is that a moving average will always be five to six months behind, since the analysis must wait for the historical data to become available. A more immediately useful technique would be to compare monthly fluctuations to the average. If a month that is normally a high-yield month does not come in as strong as expected or if a month with normally low yield is particularly bad, it could portend trouble. Exhibit 4.2 (on the following page) shows how the months of the year compare to both the 12-month moving average and to the month before it (e.g., how January compared to December, etc.). The month-to-month numbers are often larger because revenues sometimes go from peak to valley and vice versa very quickly. The month-to-month numbers will also be easier to use, because they don’t rely on the availability of moving average data.
**User Fee Cost Recovery Policy**

User fees represent about 6 percent of all general fund revenue. User fees are an increasingly popular way to fund municipal services because they assign the cost of the service directly to the customer, as opposed to the general taxpayer. The City could strengthen its user fee base by adopting an official policy on the extent to which it will seek to recover the costs of providing services through a user fee.

A user fee cost recovery policy could be very detailed—setting precise targets for the percent of cost to recover for different types of services. However, most governments take an approach that allows for more discretion, where the policy establishes full recovery as the goal for user fees, but recognizes that there will be occasional exceptions. This policy from Minneapolis, Minnesota, illustrates:

*The city shall establish user charges and fees at a level that reflects the service costs... Full cost charges shall be imposed unless it is determined that policy, legal, or market factors require lower fees.*

This policy approach will require that it be decided, on a case-by-case basis, where subsidization of a service with general tax dollars is appropriate.

User fees can be a complex and, sometimes, controversial revenue source. It may be helpful to establish a policy that describes the fundamental goals of user fees and a mechanism for regular fee review. The GFOA has made available considerable detailed information on fee policies.

**Volatile Revenue Policy**

As we have seen, the sales tax can be strongly influenced by the state of the economy. Just as an economic downturn can depress sales taxes, a buoyant economy can lead to a rapid increase. This presents a financial risk if these new revenues are used to fund recurring expenditures (e.g., new on-going programs and their associated personnel) and if these new revenues stem from an unsustainable level of consumer spending. A volatile revenue policy encourages a government to examine its past revenue trends to determine when it may next experience an anomalously high level of revenue income, and then to apply this revenue toward non-recurring uses, such as paying off debt, building up a reserve, or special projects that will reduce future operating costs.

**Exhibit 4.2**

**Average Monthly Variations in Sales Tax Revenue**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average % Difference from Previous Month</th>
<th>Average % of the 12-Month Moving Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>125.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>-33.8%</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>103.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>-10.9%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>113.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>-8.2%</td>
<td>102.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>107.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>-8.0%</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The policy for the City and County of Denver, Colorado, illustrates this type of policy:

*It is not prudent to allocate sales tax revenue that exceeds the normal growth rate (defined as the average annual growth rate over the last ten years) to ongoing programs. Therefore, sales tax revenues that exceed the normal growth rate should be used for one-time expenditures or to increase reserves for the inevitable economic downturns.*

**Short-term Borrowing Policy**

As Exhibit 3.1 showed, the City has a very low level of debt. Debt can be a source of financial flexibility, thereby mitigating the need to hold reserves. Short-term debt could be useful if the City finds itself with the need for a temporary cash infusion (to deal with an unexpected situation). However, short-term borrowing from external sources is usually considered undesirable due to, among other things, the administrative costs of arranging the deal. Accordingly, a policy usually places limits on short-term external borrowing. For example, a policy might specify that short-term instruments be used only if the transaction costs plus interest of the short-term debt are less than the cost of internal financing and if available cash is insufficient to meet working capital requirements. A policy could also state that short-term debt issued for operating purposes will be limited to cases where there is reasonable certainty that a known revenue source will be received in the current fiscal year sufficient to repay the debt, or where there is a clear financial emergency.

For many governments, interfund borrowing is preferred to external borrowing. For example, the City’s utility may make a loan to the general fund or vice versa. This is another way to increase financial flexibility, beyond that provided by reserves. A policy for interfund loans is useful because, if not carefully managed, the loans can become a cross-fund subsidization, which could lead to one group of taxpayers or ratepayers subsidizing another group. A policy can establish terms and guidelines to help avoid overly burdensome loans. The following are suggested elements for an internal loan policy:

**Definition of a Loan vs. a Transfer.** A policy should differentiate a loan from a transfer since the implications of each are different. Essentially, the difference is that operating transfers move financial resources from one fund to another, permanently, while interfund borrowings are usually made for temporary cash flow reasons and are not intended to result in a transfer of financial resources by the end of the fiscal year.

**Criteria for Making Loans.** Just as a private lender would apply criteria to a potential borrower, a policy should describe the general conditions under which an internal loan is permissible. A policy should describe these conditions and designate the appropriate authority responsible for authorizing the loan. Here are some examples of such conditions:

- The lending fund has funds available.
- The borrowing will not adversely impact the lending fund’s long-term financial condition.
- A specific source of repayment has been identified in the borrowing fund.
- The loan can be repaid within a specified period of time.
- Any legal requirements/restrictions are satisfied.

**Interest Rates and Terms.** A policy should also provide guidelines on terms and interest rates. Typically, interest rates would match prevailing rates, with the exact rate set by the finance office. For long-term loans, a repayment schedule must be set, but the loan should typically be fully amortized, preferably on a level or accelerated repayment schedule.
Grants Policy
Grants are an attractive form of funding for many local governments because they offer the possibility to reduce reliance on taxes and fees drawn from the community. On the other hand, grants can harm the government’s long-term financial position if they lead to implementation of an ongoing program that later requires support from general tax dollars when the grant expires. Further, many grants require matching funds and overhead costs that might end up diverting funds from higher-priority services. A policy can encourage grant-seeking, but should also recognize the risks of overreliance on grants and direct the organization to manage those risks. The policy from the City of Long Beach, California, instructs staff to analyze the long-term costs and benefits of a grant before accepting it:

City staff will seek out, apply for, and effectively administer federal, state, and other grants that address the city’s priorities and policy objectives and provide a positive benefit to the city. Before any grant above $50,000 is pursued, staff shall provide a detailed pro-forma to the city manager that addresses the immediate and long-term costs and benefits to the city. A pro-forma must be submitted to the city manager for all grants prior to accepting the grant award.

A policy should direct that any grants pursued are consistent with the government’s mission and strategic priorities. Spotsylvania County’s policy states that “before applying for and accepting intergovernmental aid, the county will assess the merits of a particular program as if it were funded with local tax dollars.”

After the grant has been accepted, a policy should address the possibility that the grant will end, leaving the government to decide whether to continue the program. Spotsylvania County’s policy reads that “local tax dollars will not be used to make up for losses of intergovernmental aid without first reviewing the program and its merits as a budgetary increment.”

Infrastructure Maintenance/Replacement Schedule
Rather than reserving funds to guard against the failure of worn assets, the City should develop a plan and schedule to maintain and replace assets, as needed. Exhibit 4.3 (on the following page) shows what yearly capital expenditures would be to keep up with bridge and culvert replacements. Obviously, the pattern is quite volatile. The City might consider translating this into a regular schedule, with a set annual contribution to funding that schedule. The GFOA estimates that a $10.9 million approximate annual contribution would be necessary to fund the schedule. Not only would this reduce the amount the City would have to hold in reserve (since assets would not deteriorate to critical condition), but it would greatly reduce the actual risk the City faces.
For storm sewers, the average annual contribution for a regular maintenance/replacement schedule would be about $36 million, though this is a less precise figure because the underlying information on asset condition is not as detailed.
Appendix 1. Sales Tax Revenues in Boulder, Colorado

In order to provide a little better comparative context for examining Colorado Springs’ sales tax, the GFOA requested permission from the City of Boulder to use its monthly sales tax data in a similar analysis to Colorado Springs. Exhibit A1.1 shows Boulder’s revenues since June 2004. Like Colorado Springs, Boulder has four “spikes” during the year, with a holiday spike being the largest. Boulder’s sales tax revenue is a little more volatile, with about 4 percent of the variation attributable to random factors.

Boulder also experienced a protracted decline in its trend-cycle in the wake of the Great Recession – a 10 percent drop over 21 months. This is just under half a percent per month, not too different from Colorado Springs.

Exhibit A1
Monthly Sales Tax Revenue from the City of Boulder, Colorado
Endnotes

1 The Triple-A approach is adapted from: Spyros Makridakis, Robin Hogarth, and Anil Gaba. Dance with Chance: Making Luck Work for You (Oneworld Publications: Oxford, England, 2009).

2 Drainage basins, open drainage features, discharge points, and point features are not included in the replacement cost. Adding these items would likely push it to more than $1 billion.

3 Targets have been rounded to nearest “whole” numbers for ease of use in policymaking. Also, see the main body of the report for a discussion of the independence of the risk factors and the implication for sizing the reserve.

4 Based on the 2012 budget estimate of approximately $220 million in general fund revenue.

5 See the GFOA best practice, Appropriate Level of Unrestricted Fund Balance in the General Fund, available at www.gfoa.org. According to this best practice document, governments should establish a formal policy of maintaining reserves equal to about 16 percent of revenues or expenditures, and the actual target should be based on an analysis of the salient risks the government faces — which in many cases calls for a reserve level of more than 16 percent.

6 TABOR, for example, limits the City’s ability to increase taxes.


9 The risk factors and basic review method were developed and published in: Shayne C. Kavanagh, Financial Policies (Chicago: Government Finance Officers Association, 2012).

10 The use tax is much smaller than the sales tax — comprising only around 5 percent of the total of the two.

11 This is City general fund only and excludes other sales tax revenues, such as the 2002 public safety sales tax (which is accounted for outside of the general fund, in a special revenue fund).

12 The GFOA used a method of data de-seasonalization known as multiplicative decomposition to arrive at this conclusion.

13 The trend-cycle line is calculated by taking a 12-month centered moving average of actual monthly sales tax revenue. For example, the moving average for January 2005 would be
an average of August 2004 through July 2005. February 2005 would be an average of September 2004 through August 2005, and so on. A 12-month moving average smooths out seasonal variation, leaving only the trend-cycle.

14 The term “Black Swan” derives from a belief held in England before 1697 that all swans were white — in fact, the term “Black Swan” was a common metaphor for an impossibility. Black swans were discovered in Australia in 1697, demonstrating the limits of human knowledge about the world.

15 See Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba, Dance with Chance, 2009.

16 Of course, the long-term impacts of those actions are still unknown.

17 According to the Case-Shiller Housing Index, home prices nationally since 2009 have varied in a range consistent with housing values in 2003. As of this writing, values have experienced increases for six consecutive months.

18 According to David M. Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at S&P Dow Jones Indices (which includes the Case-Shiller Housing Index), “the housing market seems to be stabilizing, but we are definitely in a wait-and-see mode for the next few months.”

19 Based on sales prices from Zillow.com.

20 Note that further analysis could be conducted with City staff to refine asset replacement costs, as well as reviewing the risk rating to incorporate more factors into the consequence (i.e., traffic count, location, major structure, etc.).

21 Drainage basins, open drainage features, discharge points, and point features are not included in the replacement cost, which would likely push it over $1 billion.

22 See GFOA Best Practice, “Sustainable Funding Practices of Defined Benefit Pension Plans” (2009), www.gfoa.org. An 80 percent funded ratio is often cited as an acceptable funding benchmark, but this figure does not have a sound actuarial basis. See, for example, Girard Miller, “Pension Puffery,” www.governing.com. Miller does state that an 80 percent funding ratio might be acceptable at the bottom of an investment market because the funded ratio will presumably rise with the market. Conversely, though, the funded ratio should be above 100 percent at the top of a market to protect against a fall.

23 On top of this, the City is leasing its hospital system, so the employees will no longer be contributing to the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association, which adds further uncertainty to the City’s future pension position.

24 Even if all ARC payments are made, an employer could still end up with an unfunded liability at the end of the amortization period if the actuarial assumptions used to calculate the ARC do not hold up (e.g., the rate of return on plan investments).


26 David G. Hitchcock, Karl Jacob, and James Wiemken, Key General Obligation Ratio Credit Ranges – Analysis vs. Reality (New York: Standard & Poor’s, 2008).

27 Based on values from Zillow.com.

28 Drainage basins, open drainage features, discharge points, and point features are not included in the replacement cost, which would likely push it over $1 billion.

29 Note that many of the risks listed in the table can be considered “independent,” meaning that the occurrence of one risk has little to do with the potential occurrence of another risk. For example, the occurrence of an extreme event has little or nothing to do with whether the City
also experiences an increase in its pension payments. In these cases, there could be a justification for holding less reserves than the total of the two numbers because it is rather unlikely that the City will experience both of these problems at once. However, other risks are not independent. For example, an economic downturn that causes a reduction in sales tax revenue would likely also impact other revenues, a natural disaster could make the City more likely to experience a critical infrastructure failure, or a natural disaster could result in interruption to sales tax revenue. Because the risk factors appear to have at least some level of significant inter-dependency (a level which is difficult to know), the approach of adding the reserve components together represents a conservative approach to sizing reserves for Colorado Springs. This approach would leave the City without any exposure to risk arising from risk factor dependency. Note that zero exposure to risk also means that the City will hold more reserves that it will probably need at any one time.

30 Based on about $220 million general fund revenue, as per 2012 budget estimates.

31 See GFOA Best Practice, “Appropriate Level of Unrestricted Fund Balance in the General Fund” (2009), www.gfoa.org. The Best Practice states that reserves equal to about 16 percent of revenues or expenditures is the minimum a government should consider for its policy and that the actual target that a government adopts should be based on an analysis of the salient risks that a government faces (which in many cases may call for a higher reserve level than 16 percent).

32 Within the “unrestricted” portion of fund balance, the City could choose to locate the reserves within the “unassigned” or “committed” categories. Municipal governments typically choose the unassigned category because the accounting requirements to place funds in the committed category are more stringent (e.g., the commitment must be made by formal action of the City Council and the language describing the conditions for using the reserves must meet a high level of precision).

33 See for example, the policy of the City of San Luis Obispo, California, which is available on the GFOA website at www.gfoa.org/financialpolicies.